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III. COMMENTS ON THE TEXT OF THE SURVEY, AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. Scope of the Present (Training) Program

1. In paragraph II, B, 2 on page 5, the Survey states that the "DD/I...has preferred to hire individuals previously trained and requiring no extensive further investment on the part of the Agency." I believe that while these individuals may be very well qualified in subject-matter fields, in most cases they will not have had previous intelligence training or experience. As a minimum they will require orientation to intelligence and to CIA, and basic training in intelligence techniques specifically related to DD/I.

2. In the same paragraph, the Survey goes on to say that the "DD/P...has had to look...to its own resources for advanced training of journeymen case officers in advanced areas of operations." This is only partly true. DD/P does conduct on-the-job training, special seminars, and, of course, TSD training. But in direct response to DD/P requests, OTR has provided for some time a wide variety of advanced, specialized courses and is prepared to develop new courses, when and if required, within its capabilities. I am more concerned over the irregular attendance of advanced, specialized courses established at DD/P request.

3. In paragraph II, C, 7 on page 9, the Survey looks forward to the "development of more efficient instructors and instructional techniques." I believe that a large part of this problem can be effectively resolved by ensuring adequate rotation and exchange assignments of instructor personnel, where this is appropriate. In addition, we are already engaged in a reasonably extensive instructor training program available to all Agency training activities. As part of a continuing program, all instructors receive instruction in Conference Techniques from [REDACTED]. Further, the OTR Educational Specialist has, since July 1959, trained over 100 OTR and other CIA component training instructors in Instructional Techniques. Supplementary measures introduced or carried forward by him include:

- a. training of an assistant Educational Specialist;
- b. development of workshops in instructional techniques;

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c. activation of an OTR Educational Committee for exchange across-the-board of training experience and development of new concepts, techniques, and materials;

d. revision or refinement of operating procedures, production of training aids, guidebooks, handbooks, and brochures.

Finally, a member of the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, OTR, is keeping in touch with developments of "teaching machines," and research is being conducted [REDACTED] under contract, in the application of teaching machines and programmed instruction to language teaching.

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B. Office of Training

1. Organization.

a. In paragraph III, A, 6 on page 12, the Survey states that from 1953... "...forward there has been a proliferation of courses adapted to special needs, but no further expansion into major new departments of instruction." Although I may have misinterpreted this statement, it literally is not so. The new courses in area training, communism, paramilitary training for the CIA Contingency Force, covert action and [REDACTED] operations, and others reflect a continuing growth in new or more clearly defined areas of instruction. This growth is not in every instance reflected by a new, administrative department or change in OTR organization. Our present OTR organization has been flexible enough to admit new courses or revisions in present courses into our system of Schools, each divided into functional or subject matter branches or faculties. The courses conducted by these faculties fall into a clear pattern of course families or groupings.

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b. With reference to III, A, 7 on pages 12 and 13, I should like to add that the present organization of OTR, as devised by OTR and endorsed by the Inspector General and the Management Staff, also includes the Junior Officer Training Program as a separate "school" or line function. Further, effective 8 April 1960, [REDACTED] was redesignated also as a "school," with its Chief of Station made responsible

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directly to the Director of Training. Headquarters staff guidance and support on training and administrative support matters are provided by the Chief, Operations School, and Executive Officer, OTR, respectively.

c. I should like to make a minor correction in fact in paragraph III, A, 8, a, on page 13. Although audio-surveillance technically is a TSD area of responsibility, the Audio-Surveillance Management Course was developed by OTR and the FI Staff of DD/P primarily as an operational course in the planning, organization, and management of a/s operations. TED provides only the technical instruction required in this course.

2. The Intelligence School

a. Although I find no large bone to pick with the Inspector General over his discussion of the Intelligence School's activities, I cannot help but feel that he has gained an impression of this School which does not reflect sharply enough its objectives and activities. There are many small inaccuracies; I will seek to point out only a few.

b. Actually, at the time of this Survey, there were six faculties comprising the Intelligence School. The Survey omitted the one-man "faculty" of the OTR Orientation and Briefing Officer, currently [REDACTED] with office and auditorium in Central Building. Further, courses offered by the Intelligence Production faculty meet professional needs of DD/P and DD/S as well as of DD/I. And the Intelligence Production Course for JOT's has been increased from 12 to 14 weeks in length, to permit the inclusion of additional scientific and other intelligence studies.

c. In paragraph III, B, 2 on page 17, I feel that the following statement is somewhat exaggerated, or perhaps too inclusive a generalization: "...In areas of employee orientation, management skills and intelligence production, however, there has been limited consensus as to what was to be done and the OTR effort has been subject to constant

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adjustment." In the areas mentioned there has been a constant effort made to update materials and to keep the courses immediately responsive to training needs. The content of OTR management courses compares favorably with that of approved AMA and college-level instruction.

d. With reference to paragraph III, B, 3 on page 6, Office of Communications employees are not exempted from Agency orientation. By cooperative arrangement, they are briefed and oriented as separate groups. In my opinion, the Office of Communications has adopted an exemplary attitude toward orientation and briefing, and in this connection it has been made mandatory for OC personnel, and their dependents whenever feasible, to attend the Americans Abroad (AAC) area orientations and the CIA Dependents' Briefings.

e. With reference to paragraph III, B, 5, on page 18, I feel that the Inspector General's remarks concerning written communications warrant a full recommendation that this subject be given immediate, active study. The problem of communication very definitely affects OTR, and we are attempting vigorously to exploit the potential of such existing publications as the OTR Bulletin and Support Bulletin, and will assist in any way we can the proposed, DD/P letter to the field.

f. I agree with the general tenor of the Survey's commentary on training in management and supervision. Whether we have management training or not depends of course on the customers' will, and whether management training is tied in with individual career development or with specific positions is itself a decision for management. Thanks, however, to aggressive DD/S participation in both external and internal management training, and thanks also to our recent, useful experience with the Senior Seminar in Management led by [REDACTED] I believe OTR has developed sufficient experience in this field of training to be able now to recommend a pattern of management training suitable to this Agency's current needs.

g. To return to a less critical area, with reference now to paragraphs III, B, 8 and 9 on pages 20 and 21, Intelligence

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School courses in effective speaking, effective writing, and conference techniques are not purely remedial in character. They are, as the Survey goes on to put it, courses which instruct all performers, strong or weak, in preferred techniques. Those performers who are found weak are given special attention. Similarly, Intelligence Production faculty intelligence courses are not aimed at the marginal performer. They are aimed at the bulk of DD/I professionals, virtually all of whom need training in the skills and techniques covered by the courses. This training would still be needed even if the DD/I would "agree to recruitment of the bulk of his junior officer requirement through a truly Agency-wide JOT system...."

b. On page 23 of the Survey, in paragraph III, B, 11 there is another minor error, probably arising from misunderstanding of information provided during the survey. Clerical applicants do not receive a "personality" test, only a short employment test on vocabulary, arithmetic, and clerical accuracy.

3. Operations School

a. As in the case of the Intelligence School, there are a number of misunderstandings or errors of fact; most of these are not of major significance but I wish to note some of them very briefly.

b. First, paragraph III, C, 1, b, reads as follows. "The Headquarters Training Staff is responsible for training in clandestine operations. The JOT, for example, after graduation from basic intelligence training, will receive further specialized training in operations from this staff...." This is not quite accurate. The Headquarters Training branch provides advanced and specialized training in clandestine operations. (Basic and familiarization training in clandestine operations, and still other advanced and specialized courses are provided [REDACTED] The Headquarters Training branch also has contributed a two-week "Clandestine Services Orientation" block in the 10-week JOT Orientation Course. After completion of the latter course,

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the JOT goes [REDACTED] for either the Operations Course or Operations Familiarization Course. Selected individuals, usually specialists, may take specialized courses thereafter, but most DD/P candidates proceed from the OC to on-the-job training in the area divisions of DD/P.

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c. With reference to paragraphs III, C, 1, d and e, on pages 26 and 27, I must take exception to the assertion that OTR courses are of "excessive length" and subject to "inflexible scheduling."

(1) The length and content of each operations course are based upon requirements presented to OTR by the Clandestine Services, and these courses are constantly reviewed and modified in accordance with DD/P special staff recommendations and with a view to improved instructional methods.

(2) The courses are of varying lengths--two, three, and four weeks, for the most part, and they are presented on either a full-time or part-time basis, according to agreement between OTR and the Clandestine Services. Student critiques very often reflect an opinion that the training time allowed is too brief!

(3) At the same time, OTR is limited in its scheduling procedures by such factors as numbers and qualifications of instructors, number and size of classrooms, availability of training aids and equipment, student and staff quarters [REDACTED] and, of course, dollars.

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In general, the Operations School strongly prefers full-time training, with the student free from the daily distractions and responsibilities of his desk, and able to derive the utmost benefit from full concentration on the training course. But if part-time training is necessary and acceptable, in the light of other, current demands on employees' time, then the Operations School will bow to necessity. Further, the Operations School favors the use of seminars as a means of exchange

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the length of tour of OTR duty is not as important as the need for a planned, staggered turnover of instructor personnel. And when the tour is completed, OTR makes a strong effort to see to it that instructors receive fair and thorough consideration for subsequent duty assignments.

g. With reference now to para. III, C, 2, f, (4), on page 32, and the problems of training doctrine, it is the consensus in OTR that the greatest problem and deficiency is the lack of an established channel or system for movement of cases, projects, studies, and other DD/P materials useful to training, from any point in the Clandestine Services to OTR. What OTR needs most is selected "raw materials" of operational doctrine or experience which can be refined into training doctrine and training materials suitable for classroom, field exercise, or covert training use.

h. As noted in the Inspector General's discussion in paragraph III, C, 2, f, (5), the Overseas Training Branch has come to play a central role in the Operations School for exploitation and processing of operational, training materials. Without overtaxing this Branch's capabilities or impairing its performance of its primary function, I intend to make sure that our standard operating procedures permit the fullest possible utilization of materials and doctrine available, consistent with proper need-to-know and compartmentation.

i. To return to the problem of sources of doctrine, I feel that OTR should look to the screening and processing, evaluation and sterilization of project files and case histories, etc. as more properly a function of the DD/P special staffs. Particularly in the more advanced areas of operational training the case method is most applicable, for it is difficult if not impossible to confine or restrict operational methodology to cut-and-dried school solutions which are the antithesis of ingenuity and flexibility in conceiving and mounting clandestine operations. At any rate, inasmuch as there is at present no OTR Training Doctrine Staff as such, the senior project officers and staff officers could work directly with the OTR School concerned in the selection and provision of training materials.

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j. Turning next to the present state of the training curriculum [REDACTED] reference is made to paragraph III, C, 2, g), I believe that only in enrollment and only in certain courses has there been "marked instability." Changes have been made in scheduling on the basis of enrollments and of other, usually external, influences, and here I iterate my general protest against "permissive" training. Course content has been modified and improved. The Operations Course, for example, has been rescheduled, modified, and shortened somewhat to enable OTR--without increases in instructional staff or additional, physical plant--to meet the requirement to train approximately double the past number of JOT's per year and to include or to change the emphasis on certain subject matter as recommended or approved by the Clandestine Services. More specifically, for example, the time devoted in the Operations Course to secret writing, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] already has been reduced for Operations Course #10, now under way. OTR is receptive to recommendations from the CI and FI staffs concerning the extent of training in investigative techniques and interrogation in this course. Finally, we are trying to shorten training time wherever improved instructional methods and techniques make this possible.

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k. I have but one brief observation to make concerning the text on covert training, and this is in reference to paragraph III, C, 2, f, (1), on page 47. Covert Training is currently receiving improved "feedback" on the post-training performance of the individual trainee, upon elicitation from the case officer. Although we appreciate the requirements of compartmentation and operational security, we do have a peculiar need-to-know and the situation can stand further improvement.

4. School of International Communism

I have already commented on the recommendation concerning this School, and wish to note only in addition that, in collaboration with the Language and Area School, the SIC also presents a course entitled Basic Country Survey - USSR, of interest to both DD/P and DD/I personnel.

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5. Language and Area School

a. The Language and Area School, in my opinion, is particularly well covered in the Survey, and, in general, I am in full agreement with the text.

b. With respect to paragraph III, E, 2, e, on page 59, it has been noted that full-time language training, which is intensive, has the advantage of being the fast means of acquiring a desired level of proficiency. In contrast, part-time training should be thought of also as long-term language training. It can provide the same proficiency, but takes longer. It also involves less pressure on the student.

c. With regard to the Overseas Effectiveness course--and specifically paragraph III, F, 7, b--I, too, regret the necessity to suspend this training. It is an expensive course to run, however, and without a confirmed enrollment it becomes an expensive risk. It has a high potential for mid-career employees, and it could become a part of a possible mid-career course.

6. Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP)

a. I am very pleased to note that the Survey has cited the JOTP "concept of selection depth..." (in paragraph III, F, 1, a, on page 76), and I urge that this concept be maintained central to our long-range planning for JOT's.

b. Both OTR and the Office of Personnel are conscious of the geographical patterns of the JOT student body, and we have compared our recruitment procedures with those of the Department of State. The make-up of a typical JOT class probably reflects the fact that our Agency recruiters are concentrated more on the eastern portions of the country where there are more sources and where there has been found a greater return for the time, effort, and money expended. Nevertheless, the college degrees and advanced studies accomplished by JOT's reflect attendance at some 165 different colleges and universities throughout the United States and abroad. Our present aim is to select from

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candidates from as many parts of the country as possible, including Hawaii. The final selection, however, should be made on the basis of quality and qualification, not school or geographic area of origin.

c. With regard to JOT graduates authorized for 1960 forward, the DD/I has advised the Chief, JOTF informally that 10 of the 25 authorized for the DD/I will be recruited directly, leaving only 15 to be brought in in 1960 through the JOTF. It is hoped that these 10 also will be afforded intelligence training, however.

d. The overall performance in JOT recruiting for 1960 is considered to be generally satisfactory, but we have not reached our reduced goal of 113. (We will probably hit 103-104.) The "production" by the university consultants has been disappointing. They need not only to be expanded in number and geographic location but also stimulated to greater action!

e. We also have tried to isolate factors affecting "declines" in recruitment. In some cases the recruiters do not have time to brief the candidates thoroughly; hence, many come here to explore. In other instances, recruitment comes so late that clearance cannot be obtained before they have taken other jobs. The cost of moving household effects for married young men is sometimes prohibitive. Our beginning salaries are attractive enough but we need the "HHS" allowance to enable the married candidates to afford the move to Washington. These and other factors are under urgent study and action will be initiated as quickly as possible.

f. OTR and the Office of Personnel are keeping close watch on Foreign Service personnel policies and practices with a view to adopting any of their measures which are particularly successful and which are applicable to our own needs. We shall continue to do so, not only with respect to personnel procurement but also to training and career planning.

g. With respect to paragraph III, F, 3, a, (2) on page 82, the "public advertised, competitive entrance test" plan

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has been tried, in collaboration with NSA. It was not successful or useful. On the other hand, CIA is receiving increased publicity, and there is no apparent impediment to application for employment. In this connection, one of the university consultants mentioned a year ago his concern over the problem of attracting bright, high-type young Americans to Government service in general, not only to CIA. We might pursue this thought, perhaps with HEW, with a view to producing an attractive brochure on careers in the Federal service, for circulation through placement and employment staffs and key educators in the universities and colleges throughout the United States. It might be supplemented by a personal letter--from the President?--to heads of these institutions and of their departments of Government, Public Administration, etc.

b. With reference to paragraph III, F, 3, c. (3) on page 83, I have already acknowledged a possible imbalance of patterns of recruitment--albeit our patterns of recruitment reflect good reason and economy--, but our ranks are open to all areas. If we can usefully expand geographically our university consultant coverage, and reasonably increase our publicity within the limitations of good security, and if we clearly base our final selections on quality, the political implications of whom we select should be minimal. I believe we must rely on the basic integrity of the CIA officer as the demonstrable counter to any allegations of misplaced or undue loyalty and influence based upon the "old school tie" or regional affiliations and prejudices.

1. Concerning paragraph III, F, 3, a. (4) and (5) on pages 83 and 84, I have already commented on the proposed panels to supplement or augment the present JOTF screening and selection procedures, and I have urged instead the positioning of selected officers from DD/P, DD/S, and DD/I on the JOTF staff on a rotational basis. The active, intimate participation of these officers in an already proven, successful system should further enhance and improve upon JOTF staff performance to date. And in this connection I do not believe that we have tended to "overemphasize intellectual qualities and to underemphasize rugged and adventurous

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traits." On the contrary! For example, when, on CA [redacted] request, OTR asked for a show of interest in volunteering for membership in the CIA Contingency Task Force and a prerequisite, three-month paramilitary training course, nearly half of the JOT students in Operations Course #9 responded, and this in the face of the obvious, low priority assigned to PM activity in general. The JOTP seeks to obtain well-rounded young people, neither musclebound nor narrow intellectuals, and it is pretty well established that the burly right tackle is not necessarily the best paramilitary case officer.

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j. There has been considerable discussion of the present system of "Agency sponsorship of JOT military duty" (see page 84 of the Survey). While this arrangement is not a major factor in JOT procurement, it is a useful device, especially in times of emergency. And it was hard to come by! I believe that this practice should be continued.

k. With respect to "intelligence training for specialists" (page 85), as I have already remarked, I believe that orientation and some basic intelligence training are useful and desirable for all new junior professional personnel.

l. With reference to paragraph III, F, 3, d, (3) on page 86, it is hard to visualize how any highly-motivated, adventuresome, young American, interested in overseas service, would not be attracted to a DD/P career! I do not see this as a problem of combating prejudices but rather as a problem of proper placement according to background and demonstrated aptitudes and capabilities. JOT training emphasizes the importance and interdependence of the three Deputy Directorates as integral parts of this Agency's functioning within the Government. And we are emphasizing that directed assignments can and will be made in the Agency's interest, at EOD if necessary.

m. The next paragraph (4) on page 87 also warrants a brief comment. I agree, of course, with the cited "answer," but I do not feel that the JOTP is "overly isolated" from the Deputy Directorates. Individual training officers of the JOTP maintain very close and continuing contacts with career

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panels and operating officials. They have to, to be effective at all in selection, screening, and placement, and in carrying out their particular responsibilities for training, career guidance and development.

a. With respect to paragraph III, F, 3, e, beginning on page 87, I can only agree that the problem of JCT attrition deserves further study and that it involves especially the career management and development of the junior officer after he leaves the JCTP.

7. Other Agency Training

I have no detailed comments to make here concerning other Agency training, other than to note my satisfaction with the cordial and very cooperative relationships existing between CTR and the Office of Communications and the Technical Services Division. The division of effort, coordination, and communication between us appears to be practicable and effective. With respect to the [REDACTED] Project, I do not feel it appropriate for me to comment at this time.

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8. The Future of Training in the Agency

In my opening comments on the Survey I expressed some general reactions and suggestions on the future of Agency training. Obviously, I am in full agreement and sympathy with many of the views of the Inspector General. Other points which he raises I believe warrant further discussion and study, and I look forward to the opportunity to review these with him and with the Deputy Directorates.

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